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a b s t r a c t
Scalar implicatures are inferences that arise when a weak expression is used instead of a
stronger alternative. For example, when a speaker says, ‘‘Some of the children are in the
classroom,’’ she often implies that not all of them are. Recent processing studies of scalar
implicatures have argued that generating an implicature carries a cost. In this study we
investigated this cost using a sentence veriﬁcation task similar to that of Bott and Noveck
(2004) combined with a response deadline procedure to estimate speed and accuracy inde-
pendently. Experiment 1 compared implicit upper-bound interpretations (some [but not
all]) with lower-bound interpretations (some [and possibly all]). Experiment 2 compared
an implicit upper-bound meaning of some with the explicit upper-bound meaning of only
some. Experiment 3 compared an implicit lower-bound meaning of some with the explicit
lower-bound meaning of at least some. Sentences with implicatures required additional
processing time that could not be attributed to retrieval probabilities or factors relating
to semantic complexity. Our results provide evidence against several different types of pro-
cessing models, including veriﬁcation and nonveriﬁcation default implicature models and
cost-free contextual models. More generally, our data are the ﬁrst to provide evidence of
the costs associated with deriving implicatures per se.
 2011 Elsevier Inc.
Introduction
Using a weak expression from a set of stronger alterna-
tives often implies that the stronger alternatives are not
applicable. For example using some instead of all or many
in the sentence ‘‘John read some of Chomsky’s books,’’
can be taken to mean that John did not read all of Chom-
sky’s books, even though the use of some is logically consis-
tent with all. Importantly, the negation of all cannot be part
of the literal meaning of some because the not all compo-
nent of the sentence can be defeased or cancelled, as in,
‘‘In fact, he’s read all of them,’’ without any infelicity aris-
ing. These inferences have been referred to as scalar impli-
catures, or scalar inferences, because they involve an
entailment (or semantic) scale (Horn, 1972), and were as-
sumed to be derived using a form of Gricean reasoning
(‘‘if the speaker had known that the all was the case, and
they thought it would have been informative and relevant,
they would have said so’’). Accounts of the linguistic envi-
ronments under which scalar implicatures arise have been
developed and formalized by Horn (1989), Hirschberg
(1991), Gazdar (1979), Chierchia (2004), Levinson (2000),
Sauerland (2004), and Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995),
amongst others, but the psycholinguistic processing of
these implicatures has been investigated only recently
and in comparatively few studies (Bott & Noveck, 2004;
Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Huang & Snedeker,
2009; Noveck & Posada, 2003). In this article, we build on
processing studies conducted by Bott and Noveck (2004,
henceforth B&N) to further understand how people com-
pute scalar implicatures.
Processing studies of scalar implicatures have focused
on distinguishing between two theories of how implicat-
ures are computed, a default theory (inspired by Levinson,
2000, and Chierchia, 2004) and a contextual theory (in-
spired by Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). The precise
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instantiation of these two accounts differs across authors
but B&N articulate the theories as follows. According to
the default account, the implicature arises automatically
and on all occasions, consistent with Neo-Gricean accounts
of implicatures (Chierchia, 2004; Levinson, 2000). On hear-
ing some of the children are in the classroom, for example,
the ﬁrst interpretation that is generated includes the
upper-bound meaning,1 some [but not all]. If the implicat-
ure is cancelled or defeased, either by contextual factors or
by explicit statement, to arrive at the lower-bound meaning,
some [and possibly all], the processor must ﬁrst pass
through a stage in which the implicature interpretation is
considered and rejected. So, according to the default theory,
the lower-bound meaning involves a two-stage derivation,
in contrast to the one-stage derivation of the upper-bound
meaning, as illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 1. According
to the contextual theory, however, the implicature is not
automatically incorporated into sentence representation,
but depends on the contextual situation (Carston, 1998;
Sperber & Wilson, 1995), as in the left panel of Fig. 1. Under
this account, the processor does not necessarily have to con-
sider the pragmatic, upper-bound interpretation before gen-
erating the literal, lower-bound meaning. Instead, at least
under some circumstances, the literal meaning can be gen-
erated directly. As B&N noted, these theories make testable
predictions about the time course of implicature and literal
interpretations. If the default theory is correct, more pro-
cessing time should be required for the lower-bound inter-
pretation than the upper-bound interpretation, and the
lower-bound interpretation should never be quicker than
the upper-bound interpretation. In contrast, the contextual
account does not predict that more time should be required
to interpret a lower-bound meaning because it does not re-
quire that the implicature be considered and rejected before
the lower-bound meaning is computed.
This hypothesis has been tested using a number of tech-
niques, including reaction time studies (B&N), self-paced
reading (Breheny et al., 2006) and visual world paradigms
(Huang & Snedeker, 2009). These initial studies seem to
have found evidence against a default view of implicature
generation. For example, B&Nmeasured reaction times in a
sentence veriﬁcation task involving sentences like Some
elephants are mammals. The pragmatic, upper-bound inter-
pretation (some [but not all]) required more time than the
logical interpretation (some [and possibly all]), whether
participants were explicitly instructed to interpret some
logically or pragmatically, or whether participants made
their own interpretations. This is opposite to the pattern
predicted by the default theory. Similarly, Breheny et al.
found that reading times on scalar quantiﬁers were longer
in contexts for which an upper-bound meaning was likely
compared to contexts in which it was not, and Huang and
Snedeker found that eye movements to referent targets
were comparatively slow to upper-bound some compared
to a quantiﬁer without an implicature (e.g., all).
Nonetheless, questions remain regarding the generality
of these ﬁndings and how participants compute implicat-
ures under different conditions. First, more recent investi-
gations have suggested alternative explanations for the
apparent delayed processing of upper-bound interpreta-
tions. Hartshorne and Snedeker (submitted for publication)
argued that longer reading times in the upper-bound con-
texts used by Breheny et al. (2006) was due to a repeated
noun penalty on the quantiﬁer and not to deriving the
implicature. When Hartshorne and Snedeker repeated the
experiments without the confounding context they failed
to observe any effects on the quantiﬁer. Similarly, Grodner,
Klein, Carbary, and Tanenhaus (2010) suggested that the
delayed referential resolution for upper-bound some com-
pared to all in Huang and Snedeker (2009) was attributable
to the salience of more apt amount descriptors (two and
three) in ﬁller items and to the use of the partitive form,
some of, as the implicature trigger. No delays were ob-
served when numerals were omitted from the study design
and when the point of disambiguation was equated. Final-
ly, Feeney, Scafton, Duckworth, and Handley (2004) failed
to ﬁnd longer response times to pragmatic interpretations
of underinformative sentences similar to those used by
B&N. They suggested that the differences might be because
of language differences across studies (B&N was conducted
in French whereas Feeney et al. was conducted in English).
Different ﬁndings across researchers suggest further work
is required to establish why implicatures are fast in some
situations and not others.
Second, it is not clear how to interpret longer process-
ing times to upper-bound sentences relative to lower-
bound sentences. The suggestion in the literature (e.g.,
B&N, Breheny et al., 2006) is that longer processing times
reﬂect delayed processing of implicatures relative to literal
meanings. An alternative, however, is that longer process-
ing times are a result of greater difﬁculty in understanding
upper-bound sentences. If participants have difﬁculty inte-
grating upper-bound sentences into existing knowledge or
discourse structures, they may delay committing to an
interpretation until they are more conﬁdent of their re-
sponse; trading off speed for an improvement in accuracy.
Fig. 1. The default implicature theory assumes an extra processing stage,
the cancelling of the implicature, relative to the contextual account. UB
and LB refer to upper- and lower-bound interpretations respectively.
1 We refer to scalar sentences as having upper-bound meanings when
they have some but not all interpretations, and lower-bound meanings when
they have the literal meaning, or some and possibly all interpretations,
consistent with Breheny et al. (2006). The terminology refers to the scale
having a bounded meaning at the upper end of the semantic scale in the
implicature case (something less than all). When we refer to experimental
conditions, however, we use the logical and pragmatic terminology used by
B&N, with logical referring to the some and possibly all interpretation ($x)
and pragmatic as the some but not all interpretation. This is because of the
similarity between our experiments and those of B&N.
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Speed-accuracy trade-off effects have been found to ex-
plain longer processing times in several paradigms. For
example, McElree and Nordlie (1999) demonstrated that
observed differences in judgment times for metaphoric
and literal sentences were likely due to the probability of
retrieving accurate interpretations rather than the time
needed to retrieve and process the information. Similarly,
McElree (1993) demonstrated that reading time differ-
ences for a verb in a frequent vs. an infrequent syntactic
environment were due to probabilities of correctly retriev-
ing the appropriate entry for the verb from the lexicon and
not due to processing costs associated with serially retriev-
ing each entry for the verb in turn. Implicature costs
caused by retrieval probabilities or speed-accuracy trade-
offs could selectively inﬂate response times for upper
bound interpretations, and mask the cancellation cost pre-
dicted by the default implicature theory for lower bound
interpretations.
Finally, even if the costs associated with implicatures
are not due to speed-accuracy trade-off issues, there are
a number of reasons why verifying a scalar implicature
might be more costly than a literal meaning. For example,
in B&N, participants might have been slower to verify
upper-bound sentences (some [but not all]) because the
upper-bound sentences involve a negation (not all) and
negation is difﬁcult to process (Clark & Chase, 1972), or
perhaps extra time was needed to identify the semantic
scale (some <many < all) and compute implications (not
many, not all) in upper-bound sentences but not lower-
bound sentences. It is important to establish the contribu-
tions of these factors because they inform us about how
pragmatic principles are instantiated into the processor.
In this article, we report three experiments that investi-
gate scalar implicatures in sentences similar to those used
by B&N, but using a paradigm that precludes trade-offs
between speed and accuracy. In Experiment 1, we test
the default implicature model using a response deadline
speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) procedure that separates
speed from accuracy (Reed, 1976; and developed for psy-
cholinguistics by McElree and colleagues, e.g., Martin &
McElree, 2008; McElree, 1993; McElree & Grifﬁth, 1995,
1998; McElree & Nordlie, 1999). In Experiments 2 and 3,
we consider an alternative hypothesis to the default model
described above and test whether generating an implicat-
ure carries a cost above that associated with the additional
semantic complexity of upper-bound sentences. Experi-
ment 2 compares an implicit upper-bound meaning of
some with the explicit upper-bound meaning of only some.
Experiment 3 compares an implicit lower-bound meaning
of some with the explicit lower-bound meaning of at least
some.
Overview of experiments
In all of the experiments presented in this article partic-
ipants read categorical sentences (e.g., All elephants are
mammals) and responded ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘false’’ according to
whether the sentences were consistent with their general
knowledge. Response time was controlled experimentally
by requiring responses to be made immediately after an
auditory response prompt, which occurred at one of sev-
eral time lags following the presentation of a sentence.
Each participant made responses over a large range of
intervals so that we could measure the growth of response
accuracy as a function of time, starting with chance
responding at very short time lags and increasing up to
asymptotic accuracy at lags of several seconds (see, e.g.,
McElree & Nordlie, 1999). The principle advantage of the
SAT technique is that it measures the temporal character-
istics of response accuracy separately from asymptotic
accuracy, whereas they are confounded in conventional
reaction time studies. Thus, in SAT studies predictions
Fig. 2. Hypothetical curves illustrating the individual effects of changes to the three SAT parameters relative to a baseline response process (Benchmark).
The SAT curve shows response accuracy as a function of response time. Smaller values of the intercept parameter correspond to earlier initiation of
information retrieval and above-chance responses (d). Larger values of the information accrual parameter correspond to steeper increases in response
accuracy (+b). Larger values of the asymptotic accuracy parameter correspond to greater response accuracy at long response times (+k).
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about processing time can be evaluated independently of
retrieval probability.
If response accuracy is measured in terms of d0 from sig-
nal detection theory, then accuracy can be modeled by Eq.
(1) below. Accuracy rises as an exponential function of the
response time, t, approaching asymptotic performance at
long response times.
d0 ¼ kð1 ebðtdÞÞ; for t > d; else 0: ð1Þ
In addition to the asymptotic level of accuracy, k, the
SAT function is characterized by two additional parameters
related to the speed of processing. The intercept, d, identi-
ﬁes the earliest point at which accuracy departs from
chance. The rate, b, determines the steepness of the accu-
racy curve and indexes the rate at which task-relevant
information is accrued. Individual effects of k, d and b
parameters are illustrated in Fig. 2. Detailed predictions
regarding the implicature models and SAT dynamics are
described below.
Experiment 1
B&N found that upper-bound interpretations of scalar
sentences (some [but not all]) had longer sentence veriﬁca-
tion response times than lower-bound interpretations
(some [and possibly all]). They interpreted this as evidence
against a default view of scalar implicatures. An alternative
explanation, however, is that there could be an inherent
difference in the difﬁculty of verifying the truth of upper-
bound sentences compared to lower-bound sentences,
and that participants were choosing to spend longer on
the more difﬁcult upper-bound sentences. For example,
in some elephants are mammals, participants might ﬁnd it
more difﬁcult to seek and fail to ﬁnd an elephant that
was not a mammal, as in some [but not all], compared to
merely ﬁnding overlap between elephants and mammals,
as in some [and possibly all]. They would consequently
allocate more time to verifying some [but not all]. In that
case, even if upper-bound interpretations were gener-
ated quickly and by default, participants might spend
longer assessing their truth compared to the truth of low-
er-bound interpretations, trading off speed to achieve an
improvement in accuracy. This possibility is illustrated in
Fig. 3. In the ﬁgure, the asymptotic accuracy differs across
conditions so that when participants are given an unlim-
ited amount of time to make their response, the pragmatic
interpretations are more difﬁcult to evaluate than the low-
er-bound interpretations. However, in spite of the lower
asymptotic accuracy for pragmatic sentences, the intercept
occurs earlier, that is response accuracy for pragmatic
sentences departs from chance at an earlier point in
processing than for lower-bound sentences. A pair of
time-course functions like those in Fig. 3 is consistent with
the default theory because the pragmatic interpretation is
generated before the lower-bound one. The time-course
functions are also consistent with B&N if participants
delayed responding to the upper-bound interpretations.
The ﬁrst experiment in this paper tests whether the time
course functions of scalar implicatures display earlier
speed dynamics for upper-bound interpretations, as in
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Illustration of a hypothetical time course function for logical and pragmatic interpretations to underinformative sentences such as some elephants are
mammals. A correct answer for participants who were responding logically would be ‘‘true’’ and a correct answer for participants responding pragmatically
would be ‘‘false.’’ The ﬁgure shows a situation in which logical interpretations have a higher asymptotic accuracy than pragmatic interpretations, yet the
earlier intercept of the pragmatic interpretation is consistent with a default implicature account. Participants in B&N could have chosen to respond at t1 in
the logical condition but delayed responding until t2 in the pragmatic condition in order obtain higher accuracy.
Table 1
Example stimuli for Experiment 1.
Sentence type Example Correct response
S1 Some elephants are mammals T or F
S2 Some elephants are insects F
S3 Some elephants are Indian T
S4 Some mammals are elephants T
S5 All elephants are insects F
S6 All elephants are mammals T
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Participants judged similar types of sentences to B&N.
The six types of sentences are shown in Table 1. We used
a variety of exemplars, subcategories and super-categories.
The critical sentences, such as some elephants are mammals,
were true under a lower-bound interpretation but false un-
der an upper-bound interpretation. For example, some [and
possibly all] elephants are mammals is true, but some [but
not all] elephants are mammals is false. Four of the remain-
ing ﬁve control sentences followed the same format as
B&N (sentences 2, 4, 5, 6 in Table 1) but we added a new
type of control sentence, S3, with a subcategory as the ﬁnal
word, such as some elephants are Indian. Without this type
of sentence, participants interpreting the critical sentence
type under an upper-bound (i.e., with a false response)
would discover that all sentences of the form some [exem-
plar] are X was false, and therefore be able to anticipate
false responses to the experimental sentence. Although
including sentence type S3 resulted in a majority of the
experimental sentences to be true, the use of d0 as our mea-
sure of accuracy discounted any response bias that this
may have caused.
Adopting an approach similar to B&N (Experiment 1),
participants were biased through instructions and practice
to be either logical or pragmatic, that is, to interpret under-
informative sentences as being either lower-bound or
upper-bound (see Rips, 1975). Instructions said that sen-
tences like some elephants are mammals were true/false.
Participants then completed a training session in which
they veriﬁed sentences and received correct/incorrect
feedback on their responses, although they were given
unlimited time to respond (i.e., the deadline procedure
was not used). Thus, participants in the pragmatic condi-
tion received feedback indicating that the correct response
to experimental sentences like some elephants are mam-
mals was false (upper-bound), whereas participants in
the logical condition received feedback indicating that the
correct response was true (lower-bound).
We analyzed correct responses to underinformative
sentences using model ﬁtting procedures described by
McElree and colleagues (e.g., Martin & McElree, 2008;
McElree, 1993; McElree & Grifﬁth, 1995, 1998; McElree
& Nordlie, 1999). Time course functions like those shown
in Fig. 2 were ﬁtted to individual participants and to
group data and we compared parameter values across
conditions. Consider what the SAT functions might look
like for upper and lower-bound interpretations. We as-
sume that the default implicature view predicts that there
are at least two separate processes involved in under-
standing quantiﬁer sentences, one associated with the
upper-bound meaning, P, and one associated with the
lower-bound meaning, R. Process P computes the mean-
ing of all the expressions in the sentence and generates
the associated implicatures. P is always triggered regard-
less of whether the implicature is (later) cancelled. Pro-
cess R involves rejecting the result of P (i.e., cancelling
the implicature) and computing the meaning of the sen-
tence without the implicature. Deriving the upper-bound
interpretation therefore involves executing only a single
stage, P, whereas deriving the lower-bound interpretation
involves executing multiple processing stages, P + R. In
SAT terms, upper-bound interpretations should have ear-
lier intercepts than lower-bound interpretations.2 Fig. 3
illustrates a hypothetical set of response curves that are
consistent with these predictions. The default view does
not make predictions about the probability of successfully
computing the upper-bound or lower-bound meanings
and consequently, no predictions can be generated about
asymptotic accuracy (although a speed-accuracy trade-off
explanation of B&N would require lower asymptotic
accuracy to be observed for upper-bound interpretations).
Importantly, participants cannot trade speed for accuracy
in this paradigm because they are forced to respond at
the deadline.
We also examined the time course of incorrect re-
sponses using the pseudo-d0 measure described in McElree
(1998) and McElree & Dosher (1989). These miss rates can
inform the interpretation of any differences that emerge
across conditions in the SAT functions discussed above
(see McElree, 1998). In particular, nonmonotonic changes
across time are symptomatic of two-stage retrieval mech-
anisms, such as the default account shown in Fig. 1. For
example, if the miss rate in the logical condition starts to
increase before decreasing (a nonmonotonic function), this
would suggest that participants initially consider the logi-
cal sentences to be false before eventually rejecting this
interpretation and deriving the correct (true) response.
The initial increase in false responding would correspond
to the computation of the upper-bound meaning (process
P, as described above) before cancellation of the implicat-
ure (process R).
Method
Participants
Thirty students from Cardiff University completed the
experiment, and were paid for participation. One partici-
pant was removed because more than 50% of their re-
sponses were out-of-time (see the ‘‘Data treatment’’
section). There were consequently 14 participants in the
logical condition and 15 participants in the pragmatic
condition.
Materials
Test sentences were 240 sets each comprised of six re-
lated sentences. An additional 70 sets of sentences were
used as practice sentences. Experimental (S1) sentences
were of the form Some <items> are <category> (e.g., Some
elephants are mammals). There were 26 different categories
(e.g., ﬁsh, trees, cars) with varying numbers of items in
each category (e.g., tuna, oaks, Ferraris). For each S1 sen-
tence there were ﬁve corresponding foil sentences. S2 foil
sentences were of the form Some <items> are <foil cate-
gory> (e.g., Some elephants are insects). The items in the foil
sentences were the same as in the S1 sentences, but the
categories were randomly re-assigned to items belonging
2 The difference could also be reﬂected in faster rates for the upper-
bound interpretations. Whether differences are observed in the rate or
intercept depends on assumptions about how much variability is inherent
to each of the suggested processes (see McElree, 1993, for a detailed
treatment of the statistics underlying serial hypotheses and McElree &
Nordlie, 1999, for an accessible discussion about this point).
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to other categories. S3 foil sentences were of the form Some
<items> are <subtype> (e.g., Some elephants are Indian). S4
foil sentences were of the form Some <category> are
<items> (e.g., Some mammals are elephants). S5 foil sen-
tences were of the form All <items> are <foil category>
(All elephants are insects), using the same foil category as
the corresponding S2 sentence. S6 foil sentences were of
the form All <items> are <category> (All elephants are
mammals).
Procedure
Trials for the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) procedure
were modelled on McElree and Nordlie (1999), and were
structured as shown in Fig. 4. Each trial began with a cen-
tral ﬁxation cross which was displayed for 500 ms, fol-
lowed one at a time by the words making up the
stimulus sentence, which were each displayed for 250 ms
except that the ﬁnal word remained on the screen until
the participant responded. An auditory response prompt
tone (1000 Hz, 50 ms) cued the participant’s response at
one of eight lag times following the onset of the sen-
tence-ﬁnal word. Participants pressed ‘1’ or ‘3’ to indicate
whether the sentence was true or false, respectively. The
experiment was programmed using DMDX (Forster &
Forster, 2003).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two con-
ditions. Participants in the logical condition judged
whether sentences were true under a lower-bound inter-
pretation; participants in the pragmatic condition judged
whether the same sentences were true under an upper-
bound interpretation. Each participant completed two ses-
sions of the assigned type, lasting for about 75 and 60 min,
respectively.
Participants were instructed to read each sentence care-
fully, decide whether it was true or false, and respond
quickly but accurately by pressing ‘1’ on the number pad
of a standard keyboard if true, or ‘3’ if false. Instructions
across the logical and pragmatic sessions were identical
except for the ﬁnal line, which read, ‘‘People sometimes
have difﬁculty responding to sentences like some elephants
are mammals. We would like you to say that these types of
sentences are true [false] because elephants are indeed
mammals [all elephants are mammals and not just some
of them].’’ After receiving these instructions participants
proceeded onto task training in which they were given
feedback on whether their response was correct or
incorrect.
A random selection of 78 of the 240 stimulus sets were
used for task training, using one sentence from each set to
obtain 39 sentences of type S1, and approximately equal
numbers of each of the other sentence types (i.e., 7 or 8
of each). The task training sentences were used in a differ-
ent random order for each participant. Task training trials
omitted the auditory response prompt. Participants re-
ceived feedback about the correctness of their responses
to be sure they were reliably judging the lower or upper-
bound meaning of the sentences as appropriate to the
particular session, particularly for the experimental (S1)
sentences which required different responses for logical
vs. pragmatic interpretations. Feedback messages ‘‘Cor-
rect!’’ or ‘‘Incorrect!’’ were displayed for 1 s before the next
trial began.
After the task training, participants were told that they
would hear a beep during subsequent sentences indicating
when responses should be made. The beeps occurred at
one of eight lags following the onset of the ﬁnal word in
each sentence. The lags were as close as possible to 27,
100, 200, 300, 400, 600, 800 or 2500 ms, synchronized with
a 75 Hz video display frame rate. Lags were chosen ran-
domly for each trial, subject to counter-balancing to ensure
equal frequencies across all lags for each sentence type.
The instructions asked participants to respond ‘‘as soon
as the beep sounds even if you are not yet sure.’’ On all sub-
sequent trials, participants received feedback about their
response time on each trial, but not about the correctness
of their responses. Responses within the target window of
100–300 ms after the onset of the beep elicited the feed-
back, ‘‘Good!’’ Responses earlier than 100 ms elicited
‘‘Wait for the beep!’’ and responses later than 300 ms elic-
ited ‘‘Too slow’’. Feedback messages were displayed for 1 s
before the next trial began.
In session 1 there were six blocks of 70 practice trials
using the full SAT task with the auditory response prompt,
as shown in Fig. 4. Each block used a random sentence
from each set of practice sentences. Counter-balancing en-
sured that all six sentences in each set were used across
blocks, with roughly equal numbers of each sentence type
in each block. After blocks 2, 4 and 6, the video displayed
the participant’s percentage of on-time responses from
the preceding 140 trials. Participants with more than 75%
Fig. 4. Structure of an SAT trial, including ﬁxation cross, series of words making up a categorical sentence, auditory response prompt, and participant key
press. Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was 27, 100, 200, 300, 400, 600, 800 or 2500 ms. Response time (RT) and key pressed (‘1’ or ‘3’) were recorded.
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on-time responses were told ‘‘Well done! Try to keep this
up by responding as soon as the beep sounds even if you
are not yet sure.’’ Participants with a lower percentage of
on-time responses were told ‘‘Try to improve on this by
responding as soon as the beep sounds even if you are
not yet sure.’’ All participants were then offered a brief rest
break and pressed a key to continue. In session 2 there was
a single block of 70 practice trials, using a random sentence
from each set of practice sentences. The video then dis-
played the percentage of on-time responses and offered a
rest break, as above.
After the practice blocks, there were six blocks of 240
test trials. Each block used one sentence from each set of
test sentences, chosen and ordered randomly for each par-
ticipant. Counter-balancing ensured that all six sentences
in each set were used across blocks, with equal numbers
of each sentence type in each block. In case task perfor-
mance suffered brieﬂy after a rest break, each test block
began with 12 ﬁller trials using sentences from the practice
set, before proceeding seamlessly into the 240 test trials.
After each block the video displayed the participant’s per-
centage of on-time responses for that block and offered a
rest break.
Results
Data treatment
Participants occasionally neglected to perform both the
veriﬁcation task and the deadline task at the same time;
instead concentrating on one or other. Failure to perform
the veriﬁcation task resulted in low d0 scores; failure to
conform to response deadlines resulted in responses out-
side the target response window. Throughout the experi-
ments reported in this article we removed participants
who obtained a d0 of less than 1.0 on the longest time
lag. We also removed participants who made less than
50% responses within the response window (i.e., 300 ms
after the deadline signal).
Computing d0
We computed d0 as the difference between the z-score
of proportion hits and the z-score of proportion false
alarms, where hits were correct responses to the experi-
mental S1 sentences and false alarms were incorrect re-
sponses to S5 and S6 sentences, as described below.
Proportion hits were calculated as the total number of cor-
rect S1 trials plus 0.5, divided by the total number of S1 tri-
als plus 1, ignoring responses outside the target response
window. Proportion false alarms were calculated in a sim-
ilar way. This adjustment ensured that z-scores were al-
ways ﬁnite.
When participants were instructed to derive the lower-
bound meaning (the logical condition), true responses to
the experimental sentences were counted as hits, whereas
when participants were instructed to derive the upper-
bound meaning (the pragmatic condition), false responses
were hits. Throughout the article we report analyses using
control sentences beginning with all as the false alarm sen-
tences. We reasoned that all sentences are the most the-
ory-neutral measure of response bias because they do
not involve an expression that would generate a scalar
implicature. In any event, we found no qualitative differ-
ences in results when we used S2 and S4 some sentences
as false alarm controls.
For Experiment 1, we report analyses based on two
types of false alarms. First, we used a discriminant false
alarm measure that was designed to take account of biases
towards true responding (or against false responding). Be-
cause the correct logical and pragmatic responses were in
opposition (true and false respectively), we had to use dif-
ferent false alarm sentences across different conditions.
For the logical condition, true responses to the experimen-
tal sentences were hits and true responses to S5 sentences,
e.g., All elephants are insects, were false alarms. In the prag-
matic condition, false responses to the experimental sen-
tences were hits and false responses to S6 sentences, e.g.,
All elephants are mammals, were (nominal) false alarms.
Second, we used a joint false alarm measure that was
computed in the same way for both groups of participants.
The joint false alarm analysis guarded against the possibil-
ity that effects observed using the discriminant false alarm
above could be an artifact of using different false alarms in
the two experimental conditions. The joint false alarm rate
was based on total true (incorrect) responses to S5 sen-
tences and false (incorrect) responses to S6 sentences.
Pseudo d0
We also analyzed misses (incorrect responses to the
experimental sentences), using a form of the pseudo-d0
prime measure described in McElree (1998) and McElree
& Dosher (1989). The aim of this analysis was to compare
incorrect responses to experimental sentences with incor-
rect responses to control sentences across the various re-
sponse lags. Unambiguous foils like S5 or S6 sentences
are assumed to involve a single-stage processing mecha-
nism that produces a monotonic decrease in incorrect
responding at longer lag times. If the experimental sen-
tences in a particular condition also involve a single pro-
cess mechanism, it might be faster or slower than in S5
or S6 sentences, but the difference should be monotonic.
In contrast, if the experimental sentences involve a two-
process mechanism, such as the default implicature theory
shown in Fig. 1, then miss rates might initially increase
during the ﬁrst process, only to eventually subside in favor
of correct responses (see McElree, 1998). Pseudo-d0 was the
difference between the z-score of proportion misses and
the z-score of the joint false alarm rate described above.
Analysis
We conducted model-based analyses on the averaged
data and the individual participant data. For the averaged
analysis, we combined the data from each group of partic-
ipants to form a single set of logical data and single set of
pragmatic data. We then minimized the squared error be-
tween the averaged data and the SAT function, and con-
ducted a hierarchical model ﬁtting analysis. We used the
lag plus the averaged latency per deadline signal as the
time coordinate, as we did throughout the experiments
presented in this paper. For the individual participant anal-
ysis, we optimized SAT functions for each participant sep-
arately. We then compared parameter values between the
logical and the pragmatic conditions using nonparametric
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inferential statistics (we used nonparametric statistics to
avoid the distorting inﬂuence of outlying parameter val-
ues). In both cases, our primary goal was to determine
whether there were differences in the processing dynamics
across interpretations, that is, the rate of information re-
trieval (b parameters) or the intercept (d parameters), or
whether the differences observed in B&N could be due to
asymptotic accuracy differences (k parameters). Faster
rates or earlier intercepts in the logical condition would
be evidence against a default implicature account. Differ-
ences in only asymptotic accuracy would mean that the
differences observed by B&N could be explained by
speed-accuracy-trade-off effects and would therefore not
discriminate between the default implicature and contex-
tual theories.
The raw accuracy rates for all three experiments are
shown in Appendix A. The average d0 data is shown in
Fig. 5 together with the fully parameterized model (param-
eter values are shown in the legend). The fully parameter-
ized SAT model for the dual logical and pragmatic
conditions includes independent parameters for each task,
so we designated this 2k–2b–2d model to indicate its six
parameters. Of primary interest, the intercept was earlier
in the logical than the pragmatic condition, and the retrie-
val rate was higher for the logical condition than the prag-
matic condition. Also, the asymptotic accuracy was
somewhat higher in the logical than the pragmatic condi-
tion, but the statistical analyses below focus on compari-
sons relevant to the hypothesis of interest.
We compared the ﬁt of the full 2k–2b–2dmodel against
a four-parameter 2k–1b–1d model, in which the time
course b and d parameters were assumed to be the same
for both logical and pragmatic conditions. The six-parame-
ter 2k–2b–2d model resulted in a signiﬁcantly lower resid-
ual error than the two k restricted model, 2k–1b–1d,
v2(2) = 22.35, p < .001. Thus, after differences in asymp-
totic accuracy across conditions have been factored out,
allowing the rate and intercept to vary across conditions
resulted in a signiﬁcantly better ﬁtting model. Speciﬁcally,
an earlier intercept in the logical condition, 320 ms
(logical) vs. 390 ms (pragmatic) and a faster rate, 1/b(logi-
cal) = 268 ms vs. 1/b(pragmatic) = 602 ms, accounted for
signiﬁcantly greater variability than assuming rate and
intercept were constant across conditions. Faster dynamics
for the logical condition mean that the results of B&N could
not be explained by a speed-accuracy trade-off.
Analysis of ﬁve-parameter models revealed that the 2k–
2b–1d model signiﬁcantly reduced residual error when
compared to the 2k–1b–1d model, v2(1) = 19.81, p < .001,
such that b was higher in the logical condition than the
pragmatic condition. Similarly, allowing d to vary across
conditions resulted in a signiﬁcantly earlier intercept in
the logical condition, v2(1) = 14.76, p < .001. Both of the
ﬁve-parameter model comparisons therefore provide evi-
dence against the default model.
In addition to analyzing the averaged data, we ﬁtted
three parameter models to each individual and compared
parameter values across conditions. Mann–Whitney tests
with N = 29 revealed that the intercept was signiﬁcantly
earlier in the logical condition compared to the pragmatic
condition, m = 0.33 vs. m = 0.47, U = 42, p = 0.006, and the
rate was marginally faster in the logical condition com-
pared to the pragmatic condition, m = 4.76 vs. m = 2.24,
U = 65.5, p = .085. Conﬁrming the conclusions of the aver-
aged data, the individual participant patterns are inconsis-
tent with a default implicature model: Participants had
earlier intercepts in the logical condition.
The results using the joint false alarm measure were
qualitatively similar to the analysis using discriminant
false alarms. For the averaged data, the six-parameter
2k–2b–2d model resulted in a signiﬁcantly lower residual
error than the 2k restricted model, 2k–1d–1b, v2(2) =
24.49, p < .001, and comparisons of the ﬁve parameter
models against the four parameter models produced sig-
niﬁcantly earlier intercepts and faster rates for the logical
condition, v2(1)’s > 16.66, p’s < .001. For the individual par-
ticipant analysis, intercepts were signiﬁcantly earlier in the
logical condition, m = 0.18 vs. m = 0.39, U = 26, p < 0.001,
but the rate was not, m = 2.81 vs. m = 2.28, U = 94,
p = 0.65. The analysis using the joint false alarm measure
Fig. 5. Averaged data from Experiment 1 together with the fully parameterized model, 2k–2b–2d, k(logical) = 3.29, b(logical) = 3.73, d(logical) = 0.32,
k(pragmatic) = 2.68, b(pragmatic) = 1.66, d(pragmatic) = 0.39.
130 L. Bott et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 66 (2012) 123–142
conﬁrms that the earlier intercepts were observe for the
logical condition cannot be because of differential perfor-
mance across conditions on the false alarm sentences.
Finally, we analysed the miss rates across conditions,
that is, incorrect response rates to experimental sentences
relative to S5 and S6 foils. Fig. 6 shows pseudo-d0 scores as
a function of time. For logical participants, pseudo-d0 was
initially quite negative (because of a response bias towards
true responding) and then increased monotonically to-
wards zero at longer response lags. For pragmatic partici-
pants, however, pseudo-d0 increased at ﬁrst to a
maximum at around 700 ms before falling back towards
zero. The pseudo-d0 appears to be nonmonotonic for prag-
matic participants but not for logical participants. While an
overall progression towards zero would be a necessary
component of an increase in standard d0 over time (as in
Fig. 5), a progression away from zero (i.e., an increase in
the error rate on experimental sentences) would be evi-
dence of a two-process interpretation mechanism. We
therefore report analyses that test whether there was a sig-
niﬁcant progression away from zero as time increases. We
compared the difference between pseudo-d0 at each time
point and each later time point. For pragmatic participants,
a difference occurred between the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth time
points t(14) = 9.45, p < .0001, where there was an increase
in pseudo-d0 away from zero, but for logical participants
there was no signiﬁcant progression away from zero for
any pair of time points, all t’s < 1. In summary, analysis of
the miss rates revealed the reverse pattern to the predic-
tions of a two-stage default processing account (as shown
in the right panel of Fig. 1): the miss rate of participants in
the pragmatic condition increased relative to errors in the
control conditions before ﬁnally decreasing, but there is no
similar pattern for participants in the logical condition.
Discussion
Experiment 1 tested whether participants interpreted
upper-bound sentences faster than lower-bound sentences
when they were not able to trade off speed for accuracy.
The default implicature account predicts that participants
should respond faster to the upper-bound sentences be-
cause deriving the lower-bound interpretation should in-
volve cancelling an implicature. In contrast, we found
faster rates of retrieval and earlier departures from chance
in the logical condition than the pragmatic condition.
More generally, our results are qualitatively consistent
with those of B&N, who found longer response times to
correct upper-bound interpretations. However, whereas
that pattern of reaction times could be explained by the
default implicature theory under the assumption that
upper-bound meanings are harder to verify than lower-
bound meanings, the earlier and faster processing we ob-
served in the SAT task for lower-bound interpretations is
not. In B&N, participants could have been delaying their re-
sponse to the upper-bound sentences in order to maximize
accuracy, whereas in our study they were prevented from
using such a strategy by the deadline procedure.
We also note that our experiment widens the range of
contexts in which an implicature is costly by demonstrat-
ing that the effect is robust across different control sen-
tences (B&N did not use sentences with subtypes, i.e., S3
in our design), a different language (B&N conducted their
experiments in French whereas our experiment was in
English), a different treatment of response options (we
analysed the data with d0 as the dependent measure),
and a different type of implicature instruction (we primar-
ily relied on correct/incorrect feedback to encourage par-
ticipants to compute interpretations whereas B&N used a
more detailed explanation of the different meanings of
some).
Our goal in Experiment 1 was to test the standard de-
fault implicature model identiﬁed in B&N. In the remainder
of the article we consider why the upper-bound interpreta-
tions were slower to verify than the lower-bound interpre-
tations. There are many potential explanations for this
effect but we break these possibilities down into two
groups. First, the underlying form of the upper-bound
interpretation is more complex and this complexity might
entail more lengthy processing. For example, when a
Fig. 6. Average pseudo-d0 rates for Experiment 1. A nonmonotonic pattern is shown for pragmatic responses but not for logical responses.
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sentence involves a scalar implicature the subject set is
broken down into a reference and a complement set, for
example, some [but not all] elephants are mammals requires
the hearer to derive a set of elephants that are claimed to
be mammals and a set that are not. In contrast, a sentence
without a scalar implicature only requires a reference set.
Dividing the subject set may take processing time (see
Grodner, Gibson, & Watson, 2005, for evidence of addi-
tional processing cost when a reader must instantiate a
complement set in addition to a reference set). Similarly,
the memory search necessary to verify upper-bound sen-
tences may be disproportionally more complex than the
memory search necessary for the lower-bound interpreta-
tion. For example, some [but not all] elephants are mammals
involves testing whether there are elephants that are
mammals and also whether there are elephants that are
not mammals, whereas only the former procedure is re-
quired for some [and possibly all] elephants are mammals.
If the procedure that veriﬁes these sentences is at least par-
tially serial, pragmatic sentences may take longer to verify
because of their propositional complexity. Second, instead
of sentence complexity causing the delay, there could be
extra work for the processor due to inferencing per se. That
is, there could be additional work required to go from the
linguistic input to the speaker’s intended meaning. This
could arise because there is a heavier dependence on con-
text, because alternative expressions might need be con-
sidered, because the literal interpretation might be
computed and rejected, because more propositions must
be computed inferentially rather than explicitly decoded,
or because of some other aspect of the inferential process.
Understanding which of these possibilities caused the
delay is important because it can narrow down the range
of theories that explain how implicatures are generated.
In particular, we consider an alternative version of the de-
fault implicature theory to that tested above. According to
this model, schematized in Fig. 7, the implicature and
cancelling process take place prior to veriﬁcation of the
sentence, as opposed to the standard default model consid-
ered above which assumes cancellation occurs after, or
during, veriﬁcation. The inference could be automatically
derived and defeased independently of the processes that
verify the propositional content of the sentence. For exam-
ple, the not all inference in some elephants are mammals
would always be derived but, crucially, cancellation would
occur independently of the processes that verify whether
elephants are mammals. This account predicts that deriv-
ing a lower-bound interpretation requires more computa-
tion than deriving an upper-bound interpretation, just as
in the standard (veriﬁcation) default model, but that this
cost could by obscured by the potentially greater cost of
verifying the more complex semantic structure of the
upper-bound sentences. This situation is illustrated in
Fig. 7. In Experiment 2, we test this account by determining
whether there is a cost to generating an implicature over
and above the cost of verifying the upper-bound
interpretation.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 we investigated implicature processing
by comparing upper and lower-bound interpretations of
the same sentences. A potential limitation of this compar-
ison, however, was that differences in semantic complexity
might have obscured the workings of a nonveriﬁcational
default implicature model. In Experiment 2 we compared
implicature sentences against sentences that had the same
meaning but which were explicit and did not involve
implicature. We compared the upper-bound some sen-
tences used in Experiment 1, as in some [but not all] ele-
phants are mammals (the pragmatic-some condition), with
explicit literal equivalents generated using the only opera-
tor, as in only some elephants are mammals (the only-some
condition; see Breheny et al., 2006, for a similar use of
only). Both sentence forms generate an upper-bound inter-
pretation and so both sentences result in equally complex
sentences, but it is only the bare some form in which the
reader has a choice about whether to derive an upper-
bound interpretation. This is illustrated by the defeasibility
of the bare some form, for example, some elephants are
mammals; in fact all of them are, compared to the non-
defeasibility of the only form, () only some elephants are
mammals, in fact all of them are. A comparison between
the two forms can therefore provide a direct test of
whether there is an inferential cost of deriving the impli-
cature independently of semantic complexity.
According to the default model, the upper-bound inter-
pretation is obligatorily triggered by the scalar term so that
whenever some is read, the implicature would always be
derived. This should apply whether some is embedded un-
der only or whether it is read as a bare quantiﬁer. Because
the upper-bound interpretation is derived in both cases,
and because a lower-bound interpretation is not consid-
ered in either case, the most straightforward prediction
from such a model would be that no rate or intercept dif-
ferences will be observed between the pragmatic and only
some conditions. It is possible, however, that there are
Fig. 7. Deriving lower-bound interpretation requires cancelling the
implicature but this occurs at a stage prior to veriﬁcation. Longer
processing times could occur for the upper-bound interpretation because
the longer veriﬁcation time could obscure the cost of cancellation.
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extra meaning components associated with the use of only
that need to be incorporated into the sentence representa-
tion. For example, that the upper-bound interpretation
cannot be cancelled or that the complement set is a partic-
ularly important part of what is communicated. If so, there
would be processing delays associated with the only condi-
tion, i.e., later intercepts or slower rates (alternatively, ex-
tra processing costs associated with only might be
incorporated into the sentence representation early on in
processing and might not be observable in the response
window at the end of the sentence). A default implicature
model therefore predicts either no differences between
pragmatic-some and only some or that only some should in-
volve slower processing than pragmatic-some.
Default accounts do not make predictions about asymp-
totic accuracy in pragmatic-some compared to only some
sentences. The asymptotic accuracy for pragmatic-some is
sensitive to the consistency with which participants
choose the upper-bound interpretation (amongst other
things). If they erroneously fail to derive the implicature
(or if they cancel it) asymptotic accuracy will be lower. Be-
cause the upper-bound interpretation is semantically
forced in the explicit only some condition but merely
encouraged in the pragmatic-some condition, lower accu-
racy might be expected in the pragmatic-some condition.
Participants classiﬁed categorical sentences as true or
false using a deadline procedure, just as they did in Exper-
iment 1. The different sentence types are shown in Table 2.
The crucial comparison is between sentence types S1, the
pragmatic-some sentences, and S2, the only some sen-
tences. All participants were given pragmatic-some train-
ing, just as they were in the pragmatic condition of
Experiment 1, so S1 and S2 sentence types were both false.
Method
Participants
Twenty-two Cardiff University students participated for
payment. Three participants were removed because their
asymptotic accuracy was less than 1.0 d0. One participant
was removed because more than 50% of their responses
were out-of-time.
Materials
Test sentences were 240 sets each comprised of six re-
lated sentences, designed so that participants could not
predict the correct answer prior to the onset of the ﬁnal
word. Experimental sentences began with ‘Some’ or ‘Only
some’ followed by an item and its supervening category
(e.g., Some elephants are mammals; Only some elephants
are mammals). The categories and items were similar to
those used in Experiment 1. There were four additional foil
sentences in each set of related sentences. S3 foil sentences
were of the form All <items> are <category> (All elephants
are mammals). S4 foil sentences were of the form
Some <items> are <subtype> (e.g., Some elephants are In-
dian). S5 and S6 foil sentences were the same as S3 and
S4, respectively, but began with ‘Only some’ or ‘All’ (e.g.,
Only some elephants are Indian; All elephants are Indian).
An additional 70 sets of sentences were used as practice
sentences.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except
that since the shortest lag (27 ms) seemed to be superﬂu-
ous it was dropped and a lag of 500 ms was included in-
stead. Participants were instructed to interpret some
pragmatically. Only some was presented as a unit in a sin-
gle presentation window of 250 ms.
Results
Hits to the pragmatic-some and the explicit only some
conditions were calculated as false (correct) responses to
the pragmatic-some and the explicit sentences respec-
tively. False alarms were false (incorrect) responses to S3
sentences, such as all elephants are mammals, for both con-
ditions. We used the same false alarm in both conditions to
avoid the possibility that observed effects might be due to
differences in performance on the false alarm sentences. S3
sentences were chosen because the subject and the predi-
cate were identical to the experimental sentences (S1 and
S2). However, as in Experiment 1, the effects replicate
whichever false alarm sentence is chosen (S3, S4, or S5).
d0 was then calculated as in Experiment 1.
We analysed the data by optimizing parameters to indi-
vidual participants’ data and to the average data, just as we
did in Experiment 1, and proceeded with hierarchical mod-
el ﬁtting. Fig. 8 shows the averaged data together with the
ﬁtted model. Accurate performance in the only condition
appears to start earlier but performance equates as more
time is available. We compared nested models to test for
differences between conditions. The fully parameterized
model, 2k–2b–2d, resulted in signiﬁcantly lower residual
error than the four-parameter 2k restricted model, 2k–
1b–1d, v2(2) = 13.82, p < .001. indicating that there were
speed differences across conditions independently of
asymptotic accuracy.
We ﬁt ﬁve-parameter models (2k–2b–1d and 2k–1b–2d)
to examine simple and unique effects of the intercept and
rate parameters. An earlier intercept in the only condition
signiﬁcantly reduced error compared to the restricted
2k–1b–1d model, v2(1) = 13.18, p < .001, and a higher b
parameter marginally so, v2(1) = 3.56, p = .059. Further
comparisons demonstrated that varying the intercept
parameter across conditions additionally reduced error
compared to varying b, 2k–2b–2d vs. 2k–2b–1d model,
v2(1) = 10.27, p < .001, but the reverse was not true, 2k–
2b–2d vs. 2k–1b–2d model, v2 < 1, suggesting that the
intercept was primarily responsible for differences across
Table 2
Example stimuli for Experiment 2.
Sentence
type
Example Correct
response
S1 Some elephants are mammals F
S2 Only some elephants are mammals F
S3 All elephants are mammals T
S4 Some elephants are Indian T
S5 Only some elephants are Indian T
S6 All elephants are Indian F
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conditions. Indeed, the four-parameter model with an ear-
lier intercept in the only condition, 1k–1b–2d, was sufﬁ-
cient to account for any signiﬁcant variability across
conditions, v2’s < 1. In summary, the average data is better
ﬁt with a model that assumes participants respond above
chance earlier in the only-some condition than in the prag-
matic-some condition.
We also analyzed the data by optimizing parameters for
each individual participant. When four-parameter models
were ﬁtted to each participant’s data, rate parameters were
signiﬁcantly faster in the only condition, m = 2.48 vs.
m = 2.47, Z = 2.37, p = .018, and intercept parameters were
signiﬁcantly earlier,m = 0.42 vs.m = 0.48, Z = 2.98, p = .003.
For ﬁve-parameter models in which k varied, i.e., 2k–2b–1d
and 2k–1b–2d, the results were similar: rate parameters
were signiﬁcantly higher in the only condition, m = 2.98
vs. m = 2.43, Z = 2.28, p = .022, and d parameters were sig-
niﬁcantly earlier, m = 0.42 vs. m = 0.49, Z = 3.07, p = .002.
Finally, for the six-parameter model ﬁts, d parameters were
signiﬁcantly earlier,m = 0.36 vs.m = 0.48, Z = 2.20, p = .028,
but there were no differences between b parameters. Re-
sults were therefore entirely consistent with the averaged
data in demonstrating faster processing of the only some
sentences.
Discussion
Experiment 2 compared interpretations of implicit
upper-bound sentences, pragmatic-some, against explicit
upper-bound sentences, only some. The sentences were
equally complex but an implicature was only required in
the implicit version. Our results were that correct respond-
ing was delayed in the pragmatic-some condition relative
to the only condition, i.e., a later intercept was needed to
accurately model the pragmatic-some condition. Interest-
ingly, we did not observe signiﬁcant asymptotic accuracy
differences across conditions. It appears that participants
were equally successful at verifying the upper-bound
interpretation whether it was semantically forced or
whether it was derived using implicature procedures.
In the introduction we suggested that there were two
types of cost that could have contributed to the delayed
upper-bound interpretations seen in Experiment 1. The
ﬁrst referred to semantic complexity differences across
interpretations, such as the extra memory search neces-
sary to verify the upper-bound interpretation, and the sec-
ond to the inferential process of deriving the implicature,
such as assessing speaker’s intentions. Our results indicate
that at least some of the cost of interpreting pragmatic sen-
tences in Experiment 1 was due to the extra time needed to
derive an implicature, and not purely to differences in sen-
tence complexity. Speciﬁcally, in Experiment 1, accurate
responses in the pragmatic condition began 140 ms later
than accurate responses in the logical condition (470 ms
vs. 330 ms, respectively) and in Experiment 2, accurate re-
sponses in the pragmatic condition began 120 ms later
than accurate responses in the only-some condition
(480 ms vs. 360 ms).3 The inferential component therefore
makes a substantial contribution to the delay of implicit
upper-bound interpretation relative to the lower-bound
interpretation.4
The observed inferential cost is inconsistent with the
nonveriﬁcation default theory that we described in the
introduction. We suggested that while the standard, veriﬁ-
cation default theory was unable to account for the results
Fig. 8. Averaged data for Experiment 2 shown together with the optimum model, 1k–1b–2d, in which k = 2.67, b = 2.42, d(only) = 0.39, and d(some) = 0.45.
3 Estimates of the differences depend on the model chosen to represent
the data in the experiments. We reasoned that the individual participant
analysis reported in Experiment 1 was comparable to a 2k–2b–2d model
because three parameters were optimized for the logical-some condition
and three for the pragmatic-some condition. We therefore compared
intercept differences from Experiment 1 with intercept differences from the
2k–2b–2d model in Experiment 2.
4 There are also likely to be costs due to semantic complexity reﬂected in
the rate parameters. Assuming the six parameter models used to derive the
intercept differences, there was a 1/b delay of 237 ms for the pragmatic
interpretations relative to the logical interpretations in Experiment 1
(447 ms vs. 210 ms) but a 70 ms advantage for the pragmatic some
condition relative to the only-some condition in Experiment 2 (423 ms vs.
354 ms). Differences across rate parameter values must be treated with
caution, however, because the individual participant analysis revealed only
a marginally signiﬁcant difference in Experiment 1, p = .085 and no
difference in Experiment 2, p = .18.
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of Experiment 1, a nonveriﬁcation default model might be
consistent with the data. This model assumed that cancel-
lation of the lower-bound meaning occurred quickly but
that complexity differences between lower and upper-
bound sentences might have obscured the cancellation
process. In this experiment we removed the differences
in sentence complexity across conditions but there re-
mained a delay in responding to implicit upper-bound
interpretations. If an implicature is automatic and occurs
on every occasion, as a default implicature theory predicts,
there should be no additional cost associated with deriving
upper-bound implicitly (pragmatic-some) compared to
deriving the upper-bound explicitly (only-some), in con-
trast to our results.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the
most straightforward versions of a default implicature the-
ory cannot account for implicature processing. We now
turn to other types of models that may explain our results.
Experiment 3
The contextual account considered in the introduction
assumed only that implicatures were not obligatorily de-
rived on reading a scalar term; sometimes the literal
meaning could be derived directly. There are therefore
potentially several versions of such a theory depending
on how context determines the choice. One possible model
is that scalar terms are systematically ambiguous between
literal and pragmatic readings and the interpretive mecha-
nism could probabilistically select between them (modu-
lated by contextual constraints). There would be no costs
associated with rejecting or cancelling the inappropriate
readings of the scalar term; instead, context determines
which is the appropriate reading and this reading is di-
rectly incorporated into the sentence representation. We
have in mind something similar to the unrestricted race
model proposed to account for resolving syntactic ambigu-
ities (e.g., Traxler, Pickering, & Clifton, 1998; Van Gompel,
Pickering, Pearson, & Liversedge, 2005). Delayed pragmatic
interpretations in Experiment 1 would be explained by dif-
ferences in sentence complexity across interpretations.
However, a model that assumed this to be the only cost
to deriving pragmatic-some interpretations could not ex-
plain the results of Experiment 2, in which complexity dif-
ferences were equated across conditions. Additional
mechanisms or alternative contextual accounts are needed
to fully explain the data.
One possibility is a system that checks context each
time a scalar term is read. For example, context might need
to be assessed to determine whether the semantic environ-
ment was an implicature licensing context (e.g., that the
environment was not negative, or downward entailing),
or speaker’s politeness intentions might need to be as-
sessed (e.g., Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 2009), or
whether it would be more informative to know that the
stronger statement is true (Breheny et al., 2006). When
the quantiﬁer is preceded by only, as in Experiment 2, there
would be no need to assess the context because the speak-
er had explicitly speciﬁed an upper-bound interpretation.
This account therefore predicts that deriving pragmatic-
some would be delayed relative to only-some. Sentence
complexity differences could explain why pragmatic re-
sponses were delayed relative to logical responses in
Experiment 1. One prediction that follows from such a
context-checking mechanism is that the same context-
checking cost should be incurred with logical-some as with
pragmatic-some. If context needs to be checked to
determine whether an implicature is appropriate, the cost
should arise regardless of the outcome.
In Experiment 3 we tested this prediction by comparing
lower-bound some (logical-some) with at least some. The ef-
fect of modifying somewith at least is to semantically force
a lower-bound interpretation, just as only semantically
forces an upper-bound interpretation. Participants classi-
ﬁed sentences as true or false under deadline conditions,
just as they did in Experiments 1 and 2, and received feed-
back instructing them to interpret some to mean some and
possibly all, as in the logical condition of Experiment 1. We
predicted that if there is a general effect of context assess-
ment we would observe later intercepts or slower rates of
growth of the SAT curves for logical-some compared to at
least some.
The six sentence types are shown in Table 3. The analy-
sis compared S1 with S2 using a repeated measures design.
Both S1 and S2 required true as the correct answer. To be
consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, we report the d0 anal-
ysis using the all sentence, S6, for the false alarms
(although using S4 and S5 result in the same qualitative
conclusions).
Method
Participants
Twenty-four Cardiff University students participated for
payment. Two participants were removed because their
asymptotic accuracy was less than 1.0 d0 and two partici-
pants were removed because they claimed to have used
an abstract strategy to perform the task, as we describe
below.
Materials
Test sentences were 240 sets each comprised of six re-
lated sentences. The categories and items were the same as
those used in Experiment 2. Experimental sentence types
(S1 and S2) began with ‘Some’ or ‘At least some’ followed
by an item and its supervening category (e.g., Some ele-
phants are mammals; At least some elephants are mammals).
There were four additional foil sentences in each
set of related sentences. S3 foils were of the form
Table 3
Example stimuli for Experiment 3.
Sentence
type
Example Correct
response
S1 Some elephants are mammals T
S2 At least some elephants are mammals T
S3 All elephants are mammals T
S4 Some elephants are insects F
S5 At least some elephants are insects F
S6 All elephants are Indian F
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All <items> are <category> (e.g., All elephants are mammals).
S4 foil sentences were of the form Some <items> are <foil
category> (e.g., Some elephants are insects). S5 foil sen-
tences were the same but began with ‘At least some’
(e.g., At least some elephants are insects). S6 foil sentences
were of the form All <items> are <subtype> (All elephants
are Indian).
An additional 70 sets of sentences were used as practice
sentences.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except
that participants were instructed to interpret some with
the lower-bound. At least some was presented in a single
250 ms presentation window, just as only some in Experi-
ment 2.
Results
Two participants told us that when the ﬁnal word in the
sentence was a subordinate category (S6 sentences) they
knew that the sentence was false without having to con-
sider the rest of the sentence. While responses to other
control sentences would not affect the results, S6 sen-
tences form part of the d0 calculation and unusual perfor-
mance on these sentences would distort our conclusions.
We therefore checked the data for these participants and
found that the SAT function intercept was negative for
these participants, suggesting that their strategy was effec-
tive. We therefore removed these participants. No other
participants mentioned a similar strategy when queried
or had a negative intercept, and even if there were a slight
effect on S6 sentences, performance in both logical-some
and at least some would be equally affected.
We analyzed the remaining participants’ data in a sim-
ilar way to Experiment 2. As in previous experiments, we
compared the six-parameter model with the restricted
four-parameter model, 2k–1b–1d. In this case however,
there was no advantage of the more complex model,
v2(2) = 2.00, p = 0.37. Indeed, there was no model that
had a signiﬁcant reduction in error compared to the
three-parameter model, 1k–1b–1d, v’s < 1.8, p’s > 0.37. Per-
formance was therefore equivalent across conditions. Fig. 9
shows the average data together with the best-ﬁtting three
parameter model.
Comparison of individual participant parameter values
were generally consistent with average data but one model
revealed earlier intercepts in the at least condition. For
four-parameter models, neither the intercept nor the rates
were signiﬁcantly different across conditions, Z = 1.76,
p = .080, and Z = 1.20, p = .23, but in the ﬁve-parameter
models with asymptotic accuracy allowed to vary, the
intercept was signiﬁcantly earlier in the at least condition,
m = 0.27 vs. m = 0.29, Z = 2.40, p = .016, and the rate was
marginally higher, m = 3.33 vs. m = 3.14, Z = 1.83, p = .067.
No signiﬁcant differences were observed for the six-
parameter model ﬁts, Z = 0.91, p = .36, and Z = 1.43,
p = .15. Because there were marginal differences between
at least some and logical-some for the ﬁve-parameter mod-
els, we compared the ﬁve-parameter differences in Exper-
iment 3 with those of Experiment 2 (while participants
were not randomly allocated to experiments, they were
nonetheless from the same population, Cardiff University
students, and each experiment involved comparisons
within subjects, so risk of biased sample effects are mini-
mal). A greater difference between only some and prag-
matic-some than between at least some and logical-some
would argue against a general context assessment account
and in favor of an implicature speciﬁc cost. For each partic-
ipant we computed the difference between the parameter
values for both conditions and compared the resulting dif-
ferences using a Wilcoxon test. This revealed that the
intercept differences in the 2k–1b–2d models were larger
between only some and pragmatic-some than between at
least and logical-some, Z = 2.59, p = .01, but rate differences
in the 2k–2b–1d models were not, Z < 1.
As a further test of whether there were differences
between the relative difﬁculty of processing some, we com-
pared d0 differences between only some and pragmatic-
some and between at least some and logical-some using a
Fig. 9. Averaged data for Experiment 3 shown together with the optimum model, 1k–1b–1d, k = 3.02, b = 3.23, d = 0.26.
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repeated measures ANOVA with time lag (1–8) as a factor.
We found that d0 differences were larger between only
some and pragmatic-some than between at least some and
logical-some, F(1,36) = 2.23, p = .028, conﬁrming the
results of the model ﬁtting analysis. We can thus conclude
that even if there is a small delay in processing logical-
some compared to at least some sentences, the delay in
processing pragmatic-some compared to only some is
signiﬁcantly larger.
Discussion
Experiment 3 tested whether logical-some was slower
to process than explicit lower-bound meanings (at least
some) in the same way that pragmatic-some was slower
than explicit upper-bound meanings (only some) in Exper-
iment 2. While some of the analyses we conducted sug-
gested the logical-some was delayed relative to at least
some, many of the analyses failed to show a signiﬁcant dif-
ference. We therefore cannot be conﬁdent that there is a
general slowdown associated with some. More conclu-
sively, comparison of the difference between the implicit
and explicit interpretations across Experiments 2 and 3 re-
vealed that the size of the difference in upper-bound inter-
pretations of Experiment 2 was signiﬁcantly larger than
the lower-bound differences of Experiment 3, i.e., prag-
matic-some was relatively more difﬁcult to interpret than
logical-some. This result is inconsistent with a contextual
account that assumes that the only explanation for delayed
pragmatic-some interpretations is a general cost in
resolving the meaning of some combined with sentence
complexity differences between upper and lower-bound
sentences. Instead, there must be an additional cost
associated with deriving the scalar implicature that does
not occur when the lower-bound interpretation is derived.
In the General Discussion we consider what these costs
might be.
General discussion
Our aim in these experiments was to investigate the
processing of scalar implicatures without confounding
accuracy with processing speed. To this end, we employed
an SAT version of the paradigm developed by B&N. In
Experiment 1 we found that the interpretation of scalar
sentences with an implicature was delayed relative to the
same sentences without an implicature. In Experiments 2
and 3 we explored why the implicature could have been
a costly interpretation. We therefore factored out semantic
complexity differences and compared pragmatic and logi-
cal some sentences against their explicit equivalents, only
some and at least some, respectively. Participants were de-
layed in their interpretation of pragmatic-some relative to
the explicit control more than in their interpretation of
logical-some. Importantly, our results cannot be explained
by speed-accuracy trade-offs, because of the deadline pro-
cedure and model-based analysis that we used (adapted
from McElree & Nordlie, 1999). Before discussing the
theoretical implications of our ﬁndings in more detail we
consider alternative explanations of our results.
In Experiments 2 and 3, the explicit forms of the sen-
tences used more words than the implicit forms. For exam-
ple, only some elephants are mammals has one more word
than some elephants are mammals. Our approach to this
was to include only/at least and some in the same 250 ms
window and force all of the sentences to have the four win-
dows regardless of the number of words. Could this design
choice explain the differences across conditions? At least
three considerations argue against this possibility. First,
we might expect participants to take longer to understand
sentences with more words whereas the results were in
the opposite direction: participants responded more
quickly to longer sentences. If anything then, our results
may have been an underestimate of the differences across
conditions. Second, because there were at most three
quantiﬁers, participants only had to glean a small amount
of information (1.6 bits) from the ﬁrst window of any sen-
tence. Across hundreds of trials, it is likely that participants
rapidly learned to efﬁciently extract the critical identifying
information (e.g., whether the quantiﬁer was only some,
some, or all in Experiment 2). Finally, if length conferred
an advantage in processing only some vs. some in Experi-
ment 2, it should have similarly facilitated processing of
at least some vs. some in Experiment 3. However, the
advantage for only some was reliably greater than that for
at least some. In short, it is unlikely that the number of
words in each quantiﬁer affected the qualitative results
of the study.
Another potential concern is that directly manipulating
the interpretation of some may have generated artefactual
effects. Perhaps instructions to interpret some pragmati-
cally were unclear, say, or perhaps the instructions forced
participants to bypass the normal pragmatic procedures.
We think that in these experiments the interpretation
manipulation was unlikely to have caused irregularities
in processing for the following reasons. First, verbal
instructions to interpret some were short and appeared
indirectly related to the experiment (c.f. B&N) wherever
possible. The instructions concluded with, ‘‘One other
thing,. . .’’ and participants were simply told that other par-
ticipants sometimes experienced difﬁculty with the under-
informative sentences but that the correct response to
those types of sentences was ‘‘true’’ (or ‘‘false’’). Further-
more, participants were only given one interpretation of
some sentences (participants in B&N were told that there
were several interpretations of some). Being told how to
interpret particular questions in an experiment is no differ-
ent to many other instructions the participant might re-
ceive about experimental procedure. By disguising the
goal of the experiment with respect to some we avoided
metalinguistic effects of directly manipulating interpreta-
tions. Second, while the verbal instructions might have
helped to push a participant towards a particular interpre-
tation, we feel that the feedback provided in the 70 prac-
tice trials (three times as many as B&N) was the major
determiner of the interpretation. It is doubtful that
participants remembered what we had told them in the
instructions after they had received the ‘‘correct’’ vs.
‘‘incorrect’’ feedback across a large number of trials. In-
deed, we believe that the feedback manipulation was so
strong that the results of the experiments would be
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identical without the verbal instructions (the difference is
that perhaps more participants would be eliminated from
the study for low overall performance without the verbal
instructions). Finally, there was no evidence that partici-
pants had difﬁculty understanding how they were sup-
posed to respond in either the logical or the pragmatic
conditions: we observed very little difference in asymp-
totic accuracy performance between the instructed some
conditions and the semantically forced interpretations (at
least some and only some).
Sentence veriﬁcation
Our study involved explicitly verifying sentences. Here
we consider limitations of this paradigm (see e.g., Feeney
et al., 2004; Grodner et al., 2010; Huang & Snedeker,
2009; Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; for criti-
cisms of the sentence veriﬁcation task).
First, because people do not explicitly verify statements
in everyday communication, is it possible that our results
are an artifact of the veriﬁcation procedure? Our view is
that asking for explicit judgments does not change the
underlying linguistic mechanisms. One reason for this is
that while people clearly do not explicitly verify state-
ments, they are likely to implicitly verify statements on a
regular basis. Understanding an assertion involves the
comparison between a proposition and one’s representa-
tion of the world, that is, an implicit veriﬁcation (and in-
deed, model theoretic semantics assumes that
interpretation amounts to deriving the truth conditions
of a sentence). For example, if someone says, ‘‘Some of
the students are in the classroom,’’ and you happen to
know that none of them are in the classroom, the inconsis-
tency between the speaker’s statement and your own
knowledge will immediately become apparent even
though you have not been asked to make an explicit veri-
ﬁcation judgment (and even when there is no inconsis-
tency between the new assertion and the knowledge of
the listener the statement must be veriﬁed in order to be
judged acceptable, i.e., not inconsistent with known infor-
mation). There is also experimental evidence that people
verify information as they are reading (e.g., Rapp, 2008)
and, more pertinent to this study, evidence that people
are sensitive to underinformativeness even when they
are not explicitly asked to verify statements (Nieuwland
et al., 2010).
Our experiments have only investigated assertions,
however, for which veriﬁcation is an intuitively natural
procedure. There are other speech acts for which it is less
clear what role veriﬁcation plays, such as requests or com-
mands, and it is an empirical question as to whether our
results generalize to these situations. While we cannot
say what would happen, we feel that implicatures may
only be derived in circumstances where the implicature
is necessary to maintain conversational coherence. Veriﬁ-
cation of underinformative sentences is one context in
which the deriving the implicature becomes necessary.
Other studies that have investigated implicatures have also
used contexts that make the distinction between lower
and upper-bound meanings very salient, and arguably nec-
essary to maintain discourse coherence (e.g., B&N; Breheny
et al., 2006; Grodner et al., 2010; Huang & Snedeker, 2009).
In Breheny et al., participants needed to derive a comple-
ment set when they read, ‘‘the others.’’ Without the deriv-
ing the implicature, the text would have been incoherent,
and so the pronoun may have been causing the implicature
to be derived, just as requiring a veriﬁcation response
forced participants to derive the implicature. Similarly, in
Huang and Snedeker, participants needed to derive the
implicature in order to determine whether to click on the
referent with some, as opposed to all, of the objects. Some
way of making the implicature a necessary part of main-
taining conversational coherence may be always be
needed, whether this is a veriﬁcation task or any other
form of contextual manipulation (consistent with ‘‘good
enough’’ processing, see Ferreira, Ferraro, & Bailey, 2002).
A ﬁnal issue with our paradigm is that it is difﬁcult to
know why participants rejected the experimental sen-
tences. Throughout the article we have assumed that par-
ticipants correctly rejected the pragmatic-some sentences
because they derived scalar implicatures and then rejected
the resulting proposition as being inconsistent with their
world knowledge. For example, we assumed that they de-
rived the interpretation some [but not all] elephants are
mammals to the experimental sentences and then rejected
them because this was incorrect relative to their represen-
tation of elephants and mammals. However, participants
may also have been rejecting the sentences because they
were underinformative relative to what the speaker could
have said (e.g., all elephants are mammals). Under a classical
Gricean account (Grice, 1975), there are at least two steps
to deriving an implicature. The ﬁrst step involves deter-
mining whether the speaker could have made a more
informative statement than the expression used (e.g., all
elephants are mammals instead of some elephants are mam-
mals), and the second step involves negating the more
informative statement to explain why the speaker chose
not to utter it (e.g., the speaker must have meant that some
but not all elephants are mammals). Participants in our
study could have been rejecting the experimental sen-
tences because the sentences were not maximally informa-
tive (after the ﬁrst step), rather than rejecting them
because the implicated meaning was false (a consequence
of the second step). A similar point was made by Katsos
and Bishop (2011) with respect to truth-value judgment
tasks used in the developmental literature on scalar impli-
catures (e.g., Noveck, 2001).
While it is possible that participants were rejecting sen-
tences entirely on the underinformativeness, some evi-
dence against this is shown in the comparison between
only-some and pragmatic-some in Experiment 2. Since the
only-some sentences explicitly specify the upperbound
meaning, rejection of these sentences is presumably based
on inconsistency with world knowledge, rather than
underinformativeness. If participants were rejecting the
pragmatic-some sentences using other criteria than those
used to evaluate the only-some sentences, accuracy rates
might be expected to differ. In contrast to this prediction
we found that the asymptotic accuracy for the only some
sentences was almost identical to that of the pragmatic-
some sentences (see Fig. 8). The high degree of similarity
between accuracy on the explicit and the implicit
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upperbound sentences is due to the strength of the biasing
context (primarily the feedback). This is quite different to
developmental studies in which participants are typically
not given a biasing context (e.g., Katsos & Bishop, 2011;
Noveck, 2001) and participants might therefore be reject-
ing sentences for different reasons in those studies.
We cannot say for sure why participants rejected the
experimental sentences. Most important, however, is that
participants were engaged in some form of Gricean reason-
ing under either account. This means that the central
hypotheses under investigation make the same predictions
regardless of which rejection account turns out to be cor-
rect. Both the standard default implicature hypothesis
and the nonveriﬁcation hypothesis assume that the impli-
cature is computed on every occasion. That is, the episte-
mic step should always be computed provided that the
epistemic conditions are met.
Implications for theories of scalar implicatures
The results of our study are strong evidence against pro-
cessing theories in which scalar implicatures are derived
on every occasion and sometimes cancelled. Included in
this set are processing theories motivated by so-called
Neo-Gricean theories (e.g., Levinson, 2000), which assume
that implicatures are derived using Gricean machinery
combined with lexical speciﬁcation of the semantic scale,
e.g., <some, many, all>. Processing accounts of Neo-Gricean
theories predict that upper-bound some should be pro-
cessed more quickly than lower-bound some, but this is
the opposite of what we found (Experiment 1). Further-
more, an extension of the standard default model to a non-
veriﬁcation model also failed to make the correct
predictions. In Experiment 2, we compared an explicitly
formed upper-bound interpretation (using only) against
an implicitly formed upper-bound interpretation. If impli-
catures are computed by default and the necessary compu-
tations occur lexically, there is no reason to predict that
there should be differences between the implicit and expli-
cit formations of the upper-bound interpretation. In con-
trast to these predictions, however, we observed delayed
sentence interpretations in the implicit condition. This
cannot be due to a general cost in resolving the bare quan-
tiﬁer because we observed a greater cost of interpreting
pragmatic-some relative to the upper-bound explicit form
(only some) than logical-some relative to the lower-bound
explicit form (at least some).
Our results also speak to processing models that as-
sume scalar implicatures are computed using the gram-
matical properties of the sentence. The linguistic models
from which these accounts might be derived are typiﬁed
by Chierchia (2004, 2006; and see Gazdar, 1979; Land-
man, 1998) (although these authors never intended their
accounts to predict processing data). Chierchia’s approach
assumes that scalar implicatures are computed recur-
sively and compositionally, in a similar to way to ordin-
ary meaning. The implicatures are computed locally
with the alternatives generated using a focus operator.
Indeed, Chierchia suggests that implicature computations
are tantamount to a silent ‘‘only’’ on the basic meaning of
the scalar term (Chierchia, 2006, p11). In our view there
are several potential processing instantiations of such a
model. One version might be that the focus operator is
always applied so that the implicature occurs on every
occasion. The implicature can be cancelled, but just as
in a Neo-Gricean account, cancellation can only occur
after the implicature has been generated. Under this view
grammatical models could be seen as default implicature
models, and with similar predictions. Our results argue
against such a model. An alternative is that context and
other factors might prevent the focus operator from being
applied on every occasion so that the lower-bound inter-
pretation could be directly incorporated into the sentence
representation. The predictions for this processing model
are less clear but, intuitively, a model that assumes scalar
implicatures are generated using a silent ‘‘only’’ operator
would not predict interpretation time differences be-
tween sentences presented with an implicit only (the
pragmatic-some condition in Experiment 2) and an expli-
cit only (the only condition of Experiment 2). Therefore,
such a model offers no explanation for the difference
we observed in Experiment 2.
Finally, we consider contextual models, in which the
implicature is not derived automatically on every occa-
sion, but instead is determined by the context. As we ar-
gued in Experiment 3, cost-free contextual models with
semantic complexity explanations cannot account for
the difference between only-some and pragmatic-some,
and contextual models that assume only a general cost
to resolving some cannot explain why pragmatic-some is
more costly to derive than logical-some, relative to their
respective literal equivalents. Consistent with the data
are therefore those models that predict a cost to deriving
the implicature, but that predict a smaller or nonexistent
cost to understanding the lower-bound interpretation. In
fact, a processing version of the standard Gricean model
accounts for our data quite well, under the assumption
that people are able to block, or prevent, the implicature
from arising in appropriate contextual circumstances. If
implicatures were not considered in the logical-some con-
ditions of Experiments 1 and 3 there would be no reason
for logical-some responses to be delayed relative to the
explicit equivalent. What mechanisms might prevent
the implicature from arising? There are at least two pos-
sibilities in a Gricean account. Participants might have
either ‘‘cancelled’’ the scalar implicature prior to verifying
the sentences, or they might not have considered the sca-
lar alternative (all) relevant to the task. Cancelling the
implicatures prior to uttering the scalar term is conceptu-
ally problematic (see Geurts, 2010, for an in depth discus-
sion of this point), but it seems plausible that participants
would never consider the scalar alternatives relevant un-
der the logical training in our task. In the logical-some
conditions, participants were never given any indication
that they should derive the implicature, so there was
no need for them to consider the alternatives important.
Conversely, in the pragmatic-some conditions, the train-
ing and feedback ensured that they must do. The extra
cost of pragmatic-some compared to only some would
arise because of the standard Gricean stages involved in
computing the scalar implicature (which we discuss in
the next section).
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Another contextual model that would be consistent
with our data is relevance theory (Carston, 1998; Sperber
& Wilson, 1986/1995). Relevance theorists argue that
going beyond the encoded content of an utterance is costly,
which explains why pragmatic-some was delayed relative
to only-some in Experiment 2. Noveck and Sperber (2007)
have also explicitly stated that the lowerbound meaning
involves going beyond the encoded content. This could ex-
plain why there may have been a cost to logical-some in
Experiment 3. Nonetheless, there are no relevance theory
speciﬁc mechanisms that might explain precisely why a
cost should arise.
Why implicatures are costly
Deriving an upper-bound interpretation involves
several extra computations relative to deriving a lower-
bound interpretation, as described above and by B&N.
These might include deriving a complement set, process-
ing negation (e.g., not all) and completing a more com-
plex memory search to integrate the meaning of the
upper-bound sentence with knowledge schemas. All of
these are part of what it means to understand a scalar
implicature. Our experiments, however, have suggested
that there are costs of implicatures linked to the inferen-
tial mechanism per se over and above whatever costs
might be associated with deriving or verifying the result-
ing (upper-bound) sentence structure (Experiments 2 and
3). Here we consider some of the possible explanations
for the inferential cost.
First, extra time might be required to execute the epi-
stemic step when generating an implicature, that is, the
inference from the speaker had no evidence that p, to the
speaker has evidence that not p (part of Step 2 of the stan-
dard Gricean account, as discussed above; see Sauerland,
2004). Experimental evidence that addressees take into ac-
count the speaker’s knowledge is shown by experiments
using unreliable or unknowledgeable speakers, in which
the pragmatic interpretation is derived only when the, par-
ticipant has a reasonable expectation that the speaker is
reliable (Bergen & Grodner, 2010; Grodner & Sedivy, in
press). The epistemic step and other speaker-knowledge
effects would not be necessary in only some sentences be-
cause only communicates that the speaker has the knowl-
edge to deny the stronger elements in the scale. Of course,
if participants were not making the epistemic step at all –
merely rejecting pragmatic-some sentences on the basis of
their underinformativeness (as considered above) – the
epistemic step cannot be the cause of the slow prag-
matic-some responses.
A second possibility is that only forces costly upper-
bound computations to occur earlier in the sentence than
implicatures. Whereas implicatures might be generated
at a sentence level, only could force the upper-bound inter-
pretation to occur on or around the quantiﬁer. Since with
only there is no doubt that the speaker intends the not all
inference to be drawn, there is no need to postpone com-
putation of the implicature until pragmatic factors, such
as speaker’s intentions, can be incorporated or assessed
at a sentence level. Under this account, the cost of implying
would be to delay processing rather than extend the time
required (although because there are extra words in the
explicit upper-bound the overall comprehension time
may be faster in the implicit upper-bound). While this ac-
count is intuitively appealing, there is very little evidence
in previous work that only affects processing (more than
implicatures) early in sentence comprehension. Using
self-paced reading tasks, Breheny et al. (2006) found a sig-
niﬁcant difference between only some and lower-bound
some on the quantiﬁer region, but no difference between
only some and upper-bound some, and Hartshorne and
Snedeker (submitted for publication) found no differences
between only some, lower-bound some, and upper-bound
some. In contrast, effects of only have been observed late
in processing. Filik, Paterson, and Liversedge (2009) inves-
tigated the difference between only and even in relation to
focus. They found longer reading times for only than even
on the region in which the complete proposition was
available but not before (although the study has limited
applicability to scalar processing because quantiﬁers were
not used and because results were reported with respect
to even). Further studies using techniques better suited
to identifying mid-sentence, lexical effects, such as
eyetracking, could be used to test the effects of only on
quantiﬁers.
A further explanation for the only some advantage de-
rives from underinformative nature of the experimental
sentences. As we discussed above, some elephants are mam-
mals is underinformative relative to what participants
know to be correct, all elephants are mammals. While par-
ticipants were given training to reject the experimental
sentences in the pragmatic-some condition, it is possible
that some infelicity remained and caused participants to
slow down their responses. The semantic properties of only
would prevent the pragmatic infelicity from arising be-
cause the only some sentences were not underinformative,
merely false. This account is possible but in order to ex-
plain the greater delay for only some compared to at least
some, a greater infelicity would have to exist in prag-
matic-some sentences than logical-some sentences (while
receiving equal amounts of contextual training), even
though the sentences were identical. Furthermore, if there
was any infelicity remaining after the training phase, it
seems likely that this would have been reﬂected in the
asymptotic accuracy measure in addition to the speed
dynamics; yet there were no differences between implicit
and explicit some.
Another potential explanation for the delayed prag-
matic-some interpretation is that the lower-bound mean-
ing might ﬁrst need to be rejected before derivation of
the upper-bound meaning can take place (a default logical
interpretation model, as opposed to a default implicature
model). While this explanation would be at odds with most
psycholinguistic investigations of pragmatics that have not
found evidence of the need to reject the literal interpreta-
tion of conventional expressions, such as indirect speech
(e.g., Shapiro & Murphy, 1993) or metaphor (McElree &
Nordlie, 1999), scalar implicatures display many distribu-
tional properties that are different to standard inferences
(see Geurts, 2010) and they might therefore invoke
quite different processing mechanisms. For example,
upper-bound scalar sentences entail their lower-bound
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counterparts, by deﬁnition (whenever some but not all X are
Y is true, some X are Ymust be true), so that it is efﬁcient to
always consider (and possibly reject) the lower-bound
interpretation on every occasion, whereas the ﬁgurative
meaning of metaphors, say, does not entail their literal
meaning.
The explanations for the implicature cost discussed
above are separate and empirically distinguishable using
the right techniques. Whatever mechanism turns out to
be causing the cost, however, it is apparently very persis-
tent. Even after corrective feedback and hundreds of trials
participants were still unable to adjust their interpretative
mechanism so that when they read ‘‘some’’ they under-
stood the upper-bound interpretation directly. It would
seem relatively simple to remap some to only some for
example, but the effects we observed suggest otherwise.
The cost of deriving a scalar implicature – relative to an ex-
plicit equivalent – seems to be obligatory in environments
such as ours.
Conclusion
The experiments presented in this study investigated
what might cause scalar implicatures to be processed more
slowly relative to equivalent sentences without an impli-
cature. Our data makes two major contributions to estab-
lishing what these costs might be. First, we have shown
that delayed upper-bound interpretations are not due to
simple speed-accuracy trade-off strategies. Second, we
made a distinction between sentence complexity costs,
that is, costs due to differences in propositional content,
and inference costs, that is, costs speciﬁcally related to
deriving the implicature. While we cannot say for sure
what proportion of the costs are due to each of these com-
ponents, we can say that there is a signiﬁcant and persis-
tent cost from the inference mechanism per se. We look
forward to the results of other studies that are able to test
which of several potential explanations are responsible for
this inference cost.
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Appendix: Raw accuracy proportions averaged across
participants
See Tables A1–A3.
Table A1
Experiment 1 accuracy proportions as a function of training condition, deadline and sentence type.
Deadline
Sentence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Pragmatic condition
S1 0.499 0.492 0.438 0.409 0.432 0.608 0.680 0.835
S2 0.515 0.574 0.660 0.757 0.862 0.897 0.923 0.928
S3 0.449 0.435 0.471 0.550 0.706 0.858 0.893 0.911
S4 0.514 0.485 0.563 0.729 0.761 0.834 0.866 0.915
S5 0.430 0.462 0.588 0.757 0.826 0.894 0.906 0.952
S6 0.528 0.581 0.667 0.748 0.802 0.876 0.930 0.937
Logical condition
S1 0.854 0.856 0.849 0.892 0.909 0.944 0.949 0.985
S2 0.144 0.187 0.393 0.620 0.747 0.838 0.818 0.877
S3 0.853 0.840 0.777 0.815 0.873 0.895 0.922 0.897
S4 0.847 0.835 0.859 0.881 0.913 0.916 0.950 0.929
S5 0.168 0.201 0.438 0.632 0.759 0.800 0.826 0.876
S6 0.840 0.888 0.883 0.924 0.929 0.945 0.947 0.961
Table A2
Experiment 2 accuracy proportions as a function of deadline and sentence type.
Deadline
Sentence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
S1 0.305 0.330 0.401 0.517 0.624 0.689 0.758 0.868
S2 0.377 0.429 0.503 0.603 0.689 0.693 0.776 0.855
S3 0.802 0.820 0.842 0.860 0.882 0.899 0.914 0.934
S4 0.641 0.616 0.708 0.748 0.760 0.810 0.868 0.902
S5 0.584 0.641 0.669 0.682 0.767 0.788 0.815 0.903
S6 0.637 0.682 0.722 0.767 0.797 0.827 0.859 0.877
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